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James Hankins
1 
 
The final section of Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) contains a remarkable and 
– according to Burton himself – largely original treatment of a condition that Burton labels 
‘religious melancholy’.
2 As analyzed by Burton, religious melancholy is of two species, both 
extremes in relation to a virtuous mean of ‘true religion’. The excess of religion is described 
as superstition, irrational religious enthusiasm or sanctimoniousness.  
 
Not that there is any excesse of divine worship or love of God, that cannot be, we cannot 
love God too much […]. But because we doe aliud agere, zealous without knowledge, and too 
sollicitous about that which is not necessary, busying our selves about impertinent, needlesse, 
idle and vaine ceremonies […] . Some of us againe are too deare, as we think, more divine 
and sanctified then others, of a better mettle, greater guifts, and, with that proud Pharisie, 
contemne others in respect of our selves. […] Of this number are all superstitious Idolators, 
Ethnickes [i.e. pagans], Mahometans, Jewes, Hereticks, Enthusiasts, Divinators, Prophets, 
Sectaries, and Schismaticks.3 
 
  At the other extreme, marked by defect or lack of religion, lie the impious of various 
descriptions: 
 
In  the  other  extreame  or  in  defect,  march  those  impious  Epicures,  Libertines,  Atheists, 
Hypocrites,  Infidels,  worldly,  secure  [i.e.  lacking  concern  for  their  souls],  impenitent, 
unthankfull,  and  carnall  minded  men,  that  attribute  all  to  naturall  causes,  that  wil 
acknowledge no supreame power; that have cauterized consciences, or live in a reprobate 
sense: or such desperate persons as are too distrustfull of His mercies.4 
 
  After dealing at length with the excess of religion (3.4.1.1-5), Burton returns again to its 
defect (3.4.2.1), giving a second list of those who display the sickness. 
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In that other extreame, or defect of this love of God, knowledge, faith, feare, hope, &c. are 
such  as  erre  both  in  doctrine  and  manners,  Sadduces,  Herodians,  Libertines,  polititians  [i.e. 
politiques in the late Renaissance sense], all manner of Atheists, Epicures, Infidels, that are 
secure, in a reprobate sense [i.e. in a state of damnation], feare not God at all, and such are 
too distrustfull and timorous, as desperate persons be: That grand sinne of Atheisme or 
impiety, Melancthon calls it, monstrosam melancholiam, monstrous melancholy.5  
 
  From a modern point of view it seems unaccountable to lump together under a single 
rubric  persons  indifferent  to  religion,  scoffers,  persons  who  defy  normal  standards  of 
morality,  statesmen  who  pursue  power  rather  than  principle,  hypocrites,  philosophical 
atheists, and the despairing – persons who are religious but doubt of their own salvation.
6 
Even odder from our point of view is the distinction Burton introduces between what one 
might call hard and soft atheism. Hard atheism is espoused by philosophers who attribute all 
to natural causes and ‘hold all religion a fiction’;
7 such an atheist will deny he has a religion 
but will call himself ‘a philosopher, a Galenist,
8 an Averroist, and with Rablais a phisitian, a 
Peripateticke, an Epicure [i.e. Epicurean].’ Burton’s examples are Averroes, Giordano Bruno 
(infelix Brunus), Machiavelli and Giulio Cesare Vanini, as well as ancient philosophers such as 
Diagoras, Demonax, Epicurus, Pliny, Lucian and Lucretius. But there is also a  ‘milder sort’ 
of ‘Atheisticall spirits’ that ‘professe religion, but timide et haesitanter, tempted thereunto out of 
that  horrible  consideration  of  diversity  of  Religions,  which  are,  and  have  beene  in  the 
world’.
9 Burton gives as his example of the latter Tommaso Campanella. These seemed to be 
the  sort  of  religious  thinker  that  would  later  be  classified  as  ‘Deists’.
10 Burton  clearly 
understands atheism in the broader, early modern sense of the word that includes not only 
persons who disbelieve in the existence of God but persons who reject the dogmas and 
moral  tenets  of  traditional  Christianity,  either  mainstream  Protestantism  or  Roman 
Catholicism.
11 It is this broader sense of atheism that will be employed in the rest of this 
essay. 
  Burton’s taxonomy only makes sense when we realize that he regards ‘true religion’ as a 
state of physical as well as mental health; or to speak more accurately, that there is a two-way 
causal relationship between mental and bodily states. Religion is natural to man and religious 
belief is sustained in most people by a balanced tempering of humors in the body. Atheism is 
‘caused’  by  wrong  beliefs  or  diabolic  activity  but  it  is  also  contracted,  sustained  and 
exacerbated  by  the  presence  of  an  abnormal  bodily  state  known  as  melancholia.  In PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ATHEISM  3 
melancholics the blood dries up and alters the body’s temperament, its humoral mixture, so 
that it is dominated by black bile or choler. This inclines a person to fear and despair and 
makes it harder to love and believe. True religion is to love and fear God in the appropriate 
measure, but that mean is hard to maintain if our bodily states do not support our animal 
spirits. Everyone can have moments of doubt but ‘corrupt affections’, if indulged, can cause 
‘this brutish passion’ to poison our mental habits permanently so that we persist in the 
unnatural state of unbelief.  
  The devil is the ‘principle agent and procurer’ of atheism, but he does this ordinarily by 
exploiting the possibilities offered by the melancholy humor: 
 
His  [the  devil’s]  ordinary  engine  by  which  he  produceth  this  effect  [despair,  doubt  and 
atheism] is the melancholy humour it selfe, which is Balneum Diaboli, the Divel’s bath; and as 
in Saul,12 those evill spirits get in as it were, and take possession of us. Blacke choler [the 
melancholy humor] is a shooing horne, a bait to allure them, in so much that many writers 
make melancholy an ordinary cause, and a symptome of despaire, for that such men are 
most apt, by reason of their ill disposed temper, to distrust, feare, griefe, mistake [i.e., incur 
doctrinal  error],  and  amplifie  whatsoever  they  preposterously  conceave  or  falsely 
apprehend.13 
 
As a concave glasse reflects solid bodies, a [brain troubled by melancholy] for want of sleepe, 
nutriment and by reason of that agitation of spirits to which Hercules de Saxonia attributes all 
Symptomes almost, may reflect and shew prodigious shapes, as our vaine fear and crased 
phantasie shall suggest and faigne.14 
 
  To  cure  the  soul-sickness  of  atheism,  Burton  stipulates  that  both  verbal  cures,  i.e., 
persuasion and argument, and medical cures are appropriate and valid. The former should be 
applied by ‘divines’, the latter by doctors. It is worth noting that professional men of religion 
here take the place of philosophers, who in antiquity would have been charged with the 
verbal part of therapeia psyches or the care of souls. 
 
Bellovacus cured a Monke by altering his habit, and course of life: Plater many by Physicke 
alone. But for the most parte they [the two therapies] must concurre; and they take a wrong 
course that thinke to overcome this ferall passion by sole Physicke; and they are as much out, 
that thinke to worke this effect by good advice alone, though both be forcible in themselves, 
yet vis unita fortior, they must goe hand in hand to this disease: Alterius sic altera poscit opem. For JAMES HANKINS  4 
Physicke, the like course is to be taken with this as in other melancholy, diet, aire, exercise, 
all  those  passions  and  perturbations  of  the  minde,  &c.  are  to  be  rectified  by  the  same 
meanes.15 
 
  Burton then goes on to present therapies of both kinds, though he spends most of his 
effort on talking cures, which he collects and digests out of a variety of religious literature, 
including  sermons,  systematic  treatises  and  apologetic  literature.  His  emphasis  on  verbal 
cures does not reflect low esteem for medical cures. It is rather that he regards medical cures 
for religious melancholy as already well known and widely available, whereas talking cures 
‘are not to all parties at hand’; his digest of ‘comfortable speeches, exhortations, arguments, 
advice’ is compiled at the specific request of friends, and was in fact added after the first 
edition of the work.
16 But he explicitly states that ‘there bee those that prescribe physicke in 
such cases, ’tis God’s instrument, and not unfit’.
17 He recommends a number of authors who 
offer purely medical treatments for melancholy, which include the use of ‘Amulets, hearbs, 
and pretious stones, which have marvelous vertues all’; music (‘so Saul was helped by Davids 
harp’), fires, lights, odors, perfumes and suffumigations.  
  A reading of Burton on religious melancholy makes it plain that he is part of a tradition of 
thought that is already well established. Even though he claims his taxonomy of religious 
melancholy is original, the sources Burton cites show that European doctors and divines had 
been  discussing  the  physiological  causes  and  cures  of  abnormal  mental  states,  including 
unbelief, irreligion and despair of salvation, for at least a century.
18 Burton cites dozens of 
authorities  from  Philip  Melanchthon  and  Levinus  Lemnius  to  Felix  Platter  and  Ercole 
Sassonia who discuss the subject. He does not, however, cite one even earlier author, an 
author who to my knowledge is the earliest author to discuss the physiological basis of 
religious despair and unbelief and to offer medical cures for it: Marsilio Ficino.
19 
 
*** 
It may perhaps surprise the reader to identify Ficino as the fountainhead of Renaissance 
discussions of the physiological causes of atheism. Ficino was a Platonist who took Plotinus 
as his most important guide to the dialogues, and it is one of the hallmarks of Plotinian 
metaphysics that higher, immaterial things cannot be in potency to material things; causal 
relationships between body and soul are a one-way street. The soul controls the body, it is PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ATHEISM  5 
‘in’ the soul, and not vice-versa. Soul remains itself untouched by the body; associated with it 
but not in union with it. Soul controls body via an eidolon or ellampsis, an image or irradiation 
of itself projected into the body; it is that which experiences bodily passions.
20 This is a view 
explicitly endorsed by Ficino in a number of places.
21 It was not necessarily Plato’s own view, 
of course; one has only to think of the famous passage in Plato’s Timaeus where he describes 
the turmoil inflicted on the soul by its being plunged into the body – its perfect circular 
motions perverted by the subrational bombardment of rectilinear motion – to realize that 
there  is  plenty  of  material  in  Plato  to  underwrite  a  more  physicalist  view  of  soul-body 
interactionism.
22 Nevertheless,  when  considering  the  history  of  the  soul-body  relation  in 
Western philosophy it is normal to regard Plato as the chief opponent of more naturalistic 
accounts of psychosomatic relations. Plato was strongly associated with the view that the 
health  of  the  body  is  dependent  on  the  health  of  the  soul,  or  sophrosyne  (see  especially 
Charmides 156d), whereas it was the Epicureans and some Stoics who were more likely to 
embrace the view that there is continuous interaction between states of the body and states 
of soul. 
  But Ficino was also a follower of Galen in medicine. In De vita (1489), his book on magic, 
Ficino says that the twin inspirations of his life were his father, the doctor Dietifeci Fecino, 
and Cosimo de’Medici: ‘the former commended me to Galen, the doctor and Platonist; the 
latter to the divine Plato. Both alike destined Marsilio to be a doctor, Galen being a doctor of 
bodies and Plato of souls.’
23 And while it is true that Galen called himself a Platonist and 
Ficino regarded him as such,
24 he could hardly be called an orthodox Platonist (whatever that 
might mean). Galen always refused to offer an opinion about the immortality of the soul or 
even  a  view  about  its  somatic  or  asomatic  character.  He  would  not  take  a  position  on 
transmigration, on the number of the soul’s parts or functions, and on other key Platonic 
psychological doctrines. His view of soul-body transactions is deeply colored by Epicurean 
and Stoic materialism and physicalism.
25 As Heinrich von Staden writes, ‘Th[e] interactive 
relation between humoral blend or temperament and the soul’s capacities is a central feature 
of Galen’s view of the body-soul relation.’
26 Even more remarkably, in the treatise Quod animi 
mores corporis temperamenta sequantur (‘That psychic behavior follows bodily temperaments’) he 
argues (as the title suggests), that the eukrasia  or good tempering of the body somehow 
contributes to moral excellence of soul. He goes so far as to claim that there is a dependence 
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physical determinism of the Stoic type. Indeed, certain diseases of soul such as delirium, 
melancholy and lethargy are clearly physical in origin and are conceived of as the result of 
humoral imbalances of various kinds. This being the case, it is natural that the soul can be 
affected by diet, environment, drugs, physical activity and other non-psychic causes. On the 
modern issue of whether mental disease should be treated by ‘talking cures’, psychotherapy, 
or by drugs and other forms of physiological intervention, Galen comes down squarely on 
the side of the latter. Like other figures in the Hippocratic tradition, Galen did not draw on 
the psychotherapeutic doctrine of Plato and did not make wide use of ‘verbal catharsis’ in his 
treatment of mental illnesses.
27 
  So despite Ficino’s Neoplatonism, we find in his writings a Galenic readiness to recognize 
the influence of the body on the soul. This theme has been explored in the large literature on 
Ficino’s  magical  doctrine  in  De  vita,  as  has  Ficino’s  doctrine  of  the  psychic  disease  of 
melancholy, especially as it relates to the notion of genius.
28 But no modern scholar to my 
knowledge has noted that Ficino also connected religious health with the health of the body, 
and religious diseases such as doubt, impiety and atheism with bodily disorders.
29 Nor does 
the literature on Burton or religious melancholy in early modern Europe recognize Ficino’s 
role in the tradition.
30 The absence of any discussion of Ficino on religious melancholy is 
easy enough to explain. Ficino’s remarks on this subject are not treated where one would 
expect to find them, in De vita, but hidden deep in the recesses of the Platonic Theology (1482), 
Ficino’s difficult 18-book work of metaphysics where he defends the immortality of the soul 
using  materials  from  the  ancient  Platonic  tradition.  Ficino’s  treatment  of  the  theme  of 
religious melancholia leading to atheism indeed casts De vita in a rather different light and 
may provide a key to Ficino’s motivation in writing it. We shall return to this point later on. 
  Ficino’s treatment of religious melancholia occurs in the third part of his Theology where 
he  is  replying  to  the  objections  of  various  philosophical  doubters  about  personal 
immortality.
31 Book 14 is devoted to answering Lucretius and the Lucretiani, who argue that 
religion itself is a sickness of soul. If I am not mistaken, it is the first example in the history 
of  Christian  apologetics  where  a  theologian  has  devoted  serious  thought  to  countering 
Lucretius’s attack on religion in De rerum natura.
32 Defending religion in general, rather than 
the Christian religion in particular, forces Ficino to consider religion itself as a category of 
analysis, and Ficino’s treatment thus becomes an important milestone in what has been 
called  ‘the  objectification  of  religion’,  the  study  of  religion  as  an  anthropological PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ATHEISM  7 
phenomenon.  And  if  Alison  Brown  is  correct  that  Lucretianism  is  a  live  option  in  late 
fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Florence, Ficino’s engagement with Lucretius can be 
understood as a dialogue with contemporary Lucretians. It is hard, for obvious reasons, to 
identify individual Lucretians in the Quattrocento,
33 but we do know of one young man in 
mid-fifteenth-century Florence who was powerfully attracted to Lucretius, namely Ficino 
himself. Ficino as a young man in the later 1450s wrote commentariola on De  rerum  natura 
which he later consigned to the flames, regarding them as products of his frivolous youth. 
We also know of one occasion in his youth when Ficino referred to Lucretius as ‘Lucretius 
ille noster Epicureorum philosophorum clarissimus’. It seems likely that Lucretian philosophy 
played  a  role  in  Ficino’s  youthful  religious  crisis,
34 and  that  the  Florentine  philosopher’s 
passionate rejection of Lucretius in the Platonic Theology was connected with his return to 
orthodoxy  and  his  lifelong  commitment  to  reconciling  Platonic  philosophy  with 
Christianity.
35  In  fact,  as  the  present  writer  has  argued  elsewhere,  Ficino’s  whole 
interpretation of the Christian religion is shaped by the need to make it impregnable to the 
Lucretian critique of religion.
36 
  In Ficino’s view, Lucretius’s aetiology of religion is reducible to three heads. Religion can 
be understood as a disease (corruptio  complexionis), as a political imposture, or as a natural 
phenomenon traceable to astrological causes (14.10.1). It has nothing to do with the real 
gods, who live a life apart from the world and have no concern for us; there is no such thing 
as Providence. Religion exploits the fears natural to the human condition and makes us 
miserable by exaggerating them and perverting them; this emotional manipulation serves the 
interests  of  priests  and  politicians  but  prevents  mankind  from  finding  the  true  way  to 
happiness, which only Epicurus among the philosophers found. The corruption of our souls 
by religion leads us to perform terrible acts, such as the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Tantum religio 
potuit suadere malorum. Doctrines such as the immortality of the soul are designed to terrify us 
into good behavior but true philosophy shows they are false. Recognition of this fact leads to 
the only kind of happiness appropriate to the human animal, the tranquility that comes from 
being free of false opinions and the passions they enflame. Most men are condemned to 
suffer from the illusions of religion but a few philosophical spirits can escape the misery of 
mankind and observe its sufferings from a loftier perspective, from the sapientum templa serena, 
like a man, safe on shore, watching a ship foundering upon the sea. JAMES HANKINS  8 
  Ficino’s defense of religion turns Lucretius’s aetiology and pathology of religion on its 
head. The specific excellence of the human species, the faculty that perfects it and sets it 
apart from the beasts, is not its ability to make objects, to govern itself, to communicate in 
words or to reason. This is what various philosophers in the past have said but they are 
wrong. The true excellence and perfection peculiar to man qua man is ‘contemplation of the 
divine’ (contemplatio divinorum). Worship is as natural to man as neighing to horses or barking 
to dogs. A man without a religious sense is a monster. This sets up what is for Ficino the 
central argument in both the Platonic Theology and De christiana religione—placed prominently at 
the beginning of both texts
37—for why there has to be a true religion amid all the human 
delusions and superstitions about the divine.  
 
Rursus,  si  homo  animalium  mortalium  perfectissimus  est,  in  quantum  homo,  ob  eam 
praecipue dotem est omnium perfectissimus quam inter haec habet ipse propriam, ceteris 
animalibus non communem, ea religio est; per religionem igitur est perfectissimus. Si religio 
esset  inanis,  per  eam  rursus  homo  omnium  esset  imperfectissimus,  quoniam  per  eam 
dementissimus esset atque miserrimus.  
 
Again, if man qua  man is the most perfect of mortal animals, he is most perfect of all 
especially on account of that gift, religion, which belongs to him alone and is not shared with 
other animals; therefore he is most perfect because of religion. Then again if religion were 
empty, man would be the most imperfect creature of all, since through it he would be made 
utterly demented and miserable. 38 
  Lucretius would be right on the hypothesis that there was no true religion, but (as Ficino 
sets out to prove in De christiana religione) there is such a religion, the Christian religion, so 
Lucretius’s argument fails. Ficino believes it is absurd and contradictory to suppose man, the 
highest of animals, is also the most miserable animal, the least capable of happiness. Absurd 
since the higher on the chain of being any substance is, the closer it will be to the source of 
beatitude. Contradictory since the same faculty, the religious sense, that makes man most 
blessed on the hypothesis that religion is true cannot be the same one that makes him most 
miserable  on  the  hypothesis  that  it  is  false.  ‘There  exists  therefore  true  religion’.
39 Since 
man’s lot is miserable unless there is hope of another life, the soul must be immortal.
40 
Moreover, if we accept (as Lucretius does not) that there is some intelligent order in the 
universe, a providence or purpose in creation, then the universality of the religious sense has PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ATHEISM  9 
to have some function tending to the perfection or happiness of the creature who possesses 
it. All men are led to natural piety via (a) a ‘natural sagacity’ infused in them by Providence, 
(b) the argument from design, and (c) prophecy and miracles. All men worship God for the 
sake of a future life, says Ficino, and this can be regarded as a kind of prophecy made by the 
species as a whole, therefore true, for ‘prophesying that comes from an entire animal species 
is true’. ‘Many reptiles slithering out of the earth’s bosom when the sun rises portend fog. 
Numerous flocks of rooks in the evening flying from a certain region of the sky foretell 
winds.’ Just so, the fact that all humanity believes in a future life shows that there is one.
41 
  Ficino’s  naturalistic  argument  for  the  existence  of  true  religion  (or  a  true  religion) 
therefore requires him to produce an equally naturalistic explanation for why some men do 
not believe in any religion at all, and it is in this context that he puts forth his account of 
‘monstrous melancholy’. He might in theory have appealed to a special reprobation of God, 
but this would have undercut his broader commitment to metaphysical optimism.
42 It would 
also have been a circulus in arguendo if used as an argument against atheism. He does appeal 
briefly, in a single sentence, to the activity of demons at the end of his long naturalistic 
account  of  the  physiological  origins  of  impiety.
43 But  since  he  is  in  principle  writing  to 
convince  the  ingeniosi  and  doubters  about  the  truth  of  religion,  he  naturally  wants  to 
emphasize the scientific explanation of impiety. This explanation he sets out in Chapter 10 
of Book XIV (§§1-8). 
  Broadly speaking, Ficino’s argument rests on the orthodox Aristotelian assumption that 
any phenomena occurring in the great majority of cases and in the more perfect cases should 
count as natural and veridical, while phenomena that appear in very few cases or in the case 
of sick people should be considered monstrosities (or aberrations as we might say) and 
misleading,  not  to  be  taken  as  evidence  in  constructing  a  definition.
44 Most  men  who 
worship God in general exhibit the normal, sanguinary balance of humors while the tiny 
minority who do not generally have depraved complexions (or temperaments, i.e., humoral 
mixtures). The converse is not true: not all those with diseased temperaments are doubters; 
far from it. Nor is it true that all clever and wise men are doubters. Ficino cites evidence 
from ancient religion both Christian and pagan to prove the opposite: 
 
The  Magi  of  the  Persians,  the  Egyptian  priests,  the  Hebrew  prophets,  the  Orphic, 
Pythagorean, and Platonic philosophers, and the ancient theologians of the Christians have JAMES HANKINS  10 
demonstrated  this.  It  is  beyond  dispute  that  all  these  excel  in  marvelous  wisdom  and 
incomparable sanctity. In discussing prayer, Porphyry says that in all nations the men who 
excel most in the study of wisdom devote themselves to prayers: among the Indians such 
were  the  Brahmans,  among  the  Persians  the  Magi,  and  the  like  among  the  Greeks  and 
Chaldaeans. This is what Porphyry says.45 And one must not suppose that these men, who 
confirmed their life’s sanctity both with everlasting works and at their own mortal peril, were 
just pretending. There have been very many other most learned philosophers, barbarian, 
Greek, and Latin, who, though they have not attained the same purity of life as those I 
recalled earlier, have led nonetheless honorable and upright lives and never hesitated to favor 
religious observances. It is possible that some of them pretended to some degree, yet I do 
not believe that all pretended or that all were wanting in religion among those who did 
pretend. For it is difficult to cast our nature entirely aside. It is reported that Diagoras, 
Dicaearchus, Epicurus, and Lucretius were impious beyond others, but that occasionally they 
too were compelled by nature to assent to sundry religious observances, as their books testify. 
But just as they raised various objections against religion without being punished, so, if the 
impious were in the majority, many other philosophers too would have openly spewed out 
the poison of their godlessness. But not to admit, as many do, one or other religious cult is 
not the same as rejecting all religion entirely. Very few have attempted the latter and they 
have done so indeed by voicing doubts rather than rooted convictions.46 
 
  It is interesting that Ficino answers preemptively the obvious objection that wise and 
clever  men  who  were  religious  might  have  been  pretending  to  be  so  out  of  fear  of 
punishment—a consideration with obvious contemporary relevance. 
  But Ficino still has to explain how, in at least a few documented cases, clever and learned 
men have doubted that any religions were true. He gives us two sorts of explanation. The 
first emphasizes the problems that arise when young men are introduced to religious truth 
without the appropriate mental and moral formation. In these cases skeptical youths are 
enjoined to be patient and trust that they will understand deeper truths when they are older 
and less passionate and have a more holistic sense of God, man and nature. If they are 
taught the disciplines in the proper order they will be much less likely to fall into irreligion 
and skepticism.
47 The second explanation, which is what concerns us here, blames atheism 
on the influence of the disease of melancholy (as distinct from the melancholic humor as 
such), a disease to which intellectuals are particularly subject. 
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Add  to  this  that  many  men  who  excel  in  some  art  are  either  natural  melancholics,  as 
Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Chrysippus were, or they become such, as Democritus, Zeno of 
Citium, Avempace the Arab, and Averroes turned out to be.48 This melancholic humor is 
cold,  dry,  and  black,  three  qualities  that  are  opposite  to  the  three  wherein  life’s  vigor 
consists—opposite, that is, to heat, to wetness, and to the transparent spirit. Such a humor, 
being the contrary of life, banishes life’s hope and injects doubt, the enemy of life, into the 
rational  soul.  Consequently  melancholics  sometimes  doubt  and  despair  of  the  soul’s 
immortality. Avempace writes that this happened to him. They doubt, not because they excel 
in intellectual ability and doctrine, but because the earthly humor makes them doubtful and 
cowardly.49 
 
  Ficino hastens to point out that the melancholic temperament is not in itself a guarantee 
of impiety: so long as men are properly educated and take care of their bodies, they ‘easily 
put doubts aside and follow their natural instinct for religion’. Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, 
Varro and Apollonius of Tyana are said to be melancholics who overcame their natural 
disposition and even ‘experience[d] the greatest hope’. So the fact that many intelligent men 
deny the immortality of the soul should be dismissed as the effects of disease, in many cases 
exacerbated by astrological causes: 
 
Moreover, those in whose birth Saturn and Mercury most dominate are often more acute. For these 
planets invite us to contemplation because they concentrate the spirits on interior things. If they are 
moving regularly forwards and are best disposed, they enhance the intelligence and do not diminish 
religion. But if they are retrograde and not best disposed, they render a man extremely fearful and 
despairing at every turn, their earthy quality being insufficiently tempered by the aspect of the other 
planets; accordingly he is doubtful and mistrusting not only in religion but in other matters as well.50 
 
  This means that we should not ‘put full trust in that opinion which results either from a 
melancholic bent, one sick and contrary in a way to life, or from an inappropriate and 
harmful position of the stars.’ Melancholics under the influence of Saturn are no more to be 
trusted in matters of religion than sick people are to be trusted to judge the taste of wine. We 
should rather trust the judgement of men who are healthy and sanguine in temperament: 
 
But in man the complexion I call healthy and natural is the perfectly tempered sanguine one. 
The sanguine is airy and consists of heat and vital wetness; and, being tempered, it is like the 
heavens and does not cloud our ability to judge the truth. Such for the most part are the JAMES HANKINS  12 
human complexions best suited to prudence and having a balanced personality. It is true they 
do not give us religion (for religion is poured divinely into our mind, since it orders us to 
neglect all else for the sake of things divine); but they do not impede religion in any way, and 
they do not inject groundless doubts into the rational soul.51 
 
  As  the  last  sentence  shows,  Ficino  is  careful  to  separate  the  causes  of  religion  and 
irreligion from the physical predispositions to the same. He is equally careful to say that the 
predominance of the melancholic humor as such does not predispose to atheism so much as 
the melancholic’s persistance in the habit of unbelief, in ‘depraved habits and customs’, that 
‘leads mankind away from religion (14.10.8).’ 
 
For men who are overly curious in any discipline because of their brain’s excessive agitation 
usually become in a way insane, their brain having dried out. [...] No wonder therefore if men 
who are overly curious about the arts are sometimes clearly mad with regard to religious and 
other matters: their insanity is made manifest both by their extremely flippant behavior and 
by the wholly ridiculous and self-contradictory opinions they hold about many matters.52 
 
  It is therefore not religion but Lucretian impiety that is caused by ‘corruption of the 
complexion’. 
 
*** 
 
It would be natural to suppose, given Ficino’s understanding of the humoral and astrological 
predispositions to atheism, that his De vita, published about seven years after the Platonic 
Theology, was written at least in part with the aim of fighting the physiological causes of 
impiety and disbelief. We know that Ficino himself was a melancholic who believed himself 
to be under the influence of Saturn, and it is likely that he had had early in life a period of 
disbelief in religion, perhaps under the influence of Lucretius and pagan versions of Plato, 
and that he later recovered his commitment to Christianity.
53 The De vita presents itself as a 
collection of cures for viri studiosi, ingeniosi and literati whose activity as thinkers makes them 
suffer from melancholia. Although he follows the famous pseudo-Aristotelian Problems (30.1) 
in saying that the greatest artists and intellectuals have been melancholics, most of Book I 
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finding ways of obviating its effect on the soul – chiefly through diet, moderate exercise, 
music, medicines, a harmonious environment, and inhalations and. talismans. In Book III he 
devotes much of his space to magical techniques for maximizing good astrological influences 
and minimizing bad ones, among them the baleful effects of Saturn on intellectuals. In all 
three books he emphasizes the importance of spiritus, the fine-material tertium quid that ties 
together  body  and  soul.  Though  as  a  Platonist  Ficino  believed  that  the  wise  man  will 
dominate the stars, sapiens  dominabitur  astris, that the mind was not under the control of 
elemental or astral influences, he also believed that even a brilliant mind could be led into 
unwisdom if its corporeal vehicle existed in an inharmonious and diseased state. The way to 
restore health and harmony of soul and body was through medicine and magic that operated 
not just on the body but also on the spiritus. 
  So the prescriptions and analysis of De vita ought to have been, on Ficinian assumptions, 
the perfect cure for atheism and religious doubt of all kinds, insofar as these were states of 
mind supported by bodily disorders. Yet Ficino nowhere says in so many words that his 
cures are intended for persons afflicted by doubt and irreligious skepticism. He does say that 
the melancholic humor, ‘if overabundant or too strong, afflicts the mind with continual 
anxiety and incessant delusions, and deranges the judgement.’ Literary men would in fact be 
particularly sane people if it were not for the fact that the black bile and phlegm of the 
melancholic forced them (compellantur) to frequent depression and even unwisdom (desipere).
54 
Elsewhere he quotes Plato to the effect that ingeniosi are subject to agitation and madness.
55 
At both the beginning and the end of Book I, quoting Plato, he reminds his readers that a 
healthy soul is also indispensable to a healthy body, and that for this one needs Christ far 
more than Socrates.
56 There are a number of other passages of similar import but no express 
declaration that his medical and magical techniques are useful to fight atheism. 
  The  reason  why  Ficino  does  not  mention  this  aim,  one  may  hypothesize,  is  that  he 
believed his book, addressed as it was to the needs of literati, would come into the hands of 
many persons who were already atheists or inclined towards impiety. If that were the case, 
they would resist any attempts to be cured of their affliction once they learned that the book 
was intended for that purpose. They were presumably indocibiles in the technical sense that 
word acquired in Ficino’s pedagogy, skeptics and sophists who thought they already knew 
the  answers.
57 But  if  they  were  melancholics  and  Saturnians  suffering  from  the  other 
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and apply its remedies if they believed it was intended simply as a guide to health. This 
hypothesis receives some color from a remark Ficino makes in the Apology at the end of the 
De vita, addressed to three of his closest disciples: 
 
You know, I think, that I have written a book, On Life, divided into three little books. The 
first book will be entitled On a Healthy Life, the second, On a Long Life, and the third, On Life 
from the Heavens. The title will act as a pleasant bait, then, and will attract as many as possible 
to taste of it; but in such a great number, a good many will be ignorant, as I think, and not a 
few malicious as well.58 
 
  The word ‘bait’ (esca) alerts us to what is probably going on in the case of De vita. Ficino 
was almost obsessed with what he took to be a major fault with the pedagogy of his time, i.e., 
its tendency to follow a perverse order in presenting philosophical doctrine, with the result 
that students of philosophy ended up regarding religion as a collection of old-wive’s tales. 
Ficino himself followed what he took to be Socrates’s practice: refuting the indocibiles with 
the hope of rendering them docibiles through the elenchus; then using moral suasion and 
dialectic on the docibiles; then finally revealing the inner secrets of philosophy only to mature 
disciples who were already morally pure and throughly educated in advanced logic and the 
sciences. There was also a gentler way of dealing with the indocibiles, which was to attract 
them to doctrines they might otherwise find repulsive by means of jokes and verbal play, 
fables, poetry, and practical knowledge: 
 
Our Plato, in the midst of treating, often in a hidden manner, the necessary duty of the 
human race, from time to time seems to joke and play. But Platonic jokes and games are 
much more serious than the serious discourse of the Stoics. For he does not disdain to 
wander anywhere through more humble things so long as he can insensibly captivate his 
humbler  listeners  and  lead  them  more  easily  to  the  sublime.  Often—for  very  serious 
reasons—he will mix the useful and the sweet, so that by his gentle wit and seductive talk he 
may use the bait (esca) of pleasure to entice minds naturally prone to pleasure to take solid 
food.59 
 
  So one explanation that would save the phenomena is that Ficino is concealing for tactical 
reasons his hope that De vita will act as a bait to lure religious melancholics into a sound 
regimen, and that this will in turn strengthen their bodies and spirits to the point where they PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ATHEISM  15 
can return to health and true religion. If melancholy, as Burton declared, was the devil’s bait, 
sound medicine, Ficino must have thought, was the bait of God. 
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Clarendon edition of Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. J. B. Bamborough, et al., 6 volumes (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989); the page numbers cited are from this edition. Bamborough’s commentary on Part 3, 
Section 4 is in volume 6.  
3 Burton, Anatomy, 3.4.1.1, pp. 337-38. 
4  Burton, Anatomy, 3.4.1.1, p. 338. 
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8 ‘Galenists’ are presumably included here owing to Galen’s reputation for offering a somaticist view of the soul, 
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L’impieté des deistes athées, et libertins de ce temps (Paris, 1624), f. ii r-v, Mersenne distinguishes between the 
traditional term ‘atheist’ and the new term ‘deist’, which, he says, is simply a cloak borrowed by ‘les complices 
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17 Burton, Anatomy, 3.4.2.6, p. 443. JAMES HANKINS  16 
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